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PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION:
THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE
James E. Fleming*
INTRODUCTION
I am deeply honored that John D. Feerick invited me to come back to
Fordham University School of Law and appear in this splendid conference.
Yet I hasten to say that, when it comes to presidential succession, John
Feerick and Joel K. Goldstein are tough acts to follow. Indeed, in an
otherwise wonderfully organized conference, the line of succession here is
flawed. I suppose I should declare myself unqualified to follow these
experts on presidential succession! I shall bring the perspective of the
constitutional theory generalist to bear on the questions framed for our
panel.
In thinking about the adequacy of the presidential succession system in
the twenty-first century, we might take either of two routes: (1) try to
design an ideal system, given the kinds of problems we can imagine, and
given our basic constitutional commitments and aspirations, or (2) attempt
to work with the system we have, tweaking it in politically feasible ways to
make it better, given an understanding of politics as the art of the possible.
If I were to take the first approach, I could hardly do better than the
Continuity of Government Commission has done in its Second Report.1 I
would simply move for the adoption of their recommendations. I suppose,
though, that doing so would make for a boring paper—even if John C.
Fortier and Norman J. Ornstein, both on the Commission and here at the
conference, would find it gratifying.
Instead, I am going to take the second approach. I shall put on my
political scientist hat and think about what is politically feasible from where
we sit. In thinking about feasible reforms, we must begin with the sobering
reality that a people who did not abolish or amend the Electoral College
after the Bush-Gore presidential election controversy is not likely to adopt
* Professor of Law, The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law, and
Associate Dean for Research, Boston University School of Law. I prepared this Essay for
the symposium on The Adequacy of the Presidential Succession System in the Twenty-First
Century, held at Fordham University School of Law, April 16–17, 2010. From 1991 to
2007, I was a law professor at Fordham, and I want to thank John D. Feerick and the
Fordham Law Review for inviting me to come back to Fordham for the symposium and for
their gracious hospitality on that occasion. I gratefully acknowledge Jameson Rice of
Boston University School of Law, Class of 2011, for his helpful research assistance.
1. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE CONTINUITY
OF THE PRESIDENCY (Second Report June 2009).
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recommendations like those in the Continuity of Government Commission
Report. We got the Twenty-Fifth Amendment only after the assassination
of President John F. Kennedy, itself after a previous elderly President
Dwight Eisenhower had serious medical problems while in office.2 We got
the Twenty-Second Amendment only after President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt was elected to four terms.3 We got the Presidential Succession
Act of 1947 only after that same President died in office, early in his fourth
term.4 And only after his successor, Harry S. Truman, lost control of both
houses of Congress in the 1946 elections.5 And so, I fear that we are not
likely to adopt sound and sensible recommendations like those in the
Continuity of Government Commission Report until after a national
catastrophe like those chillingly hypothesized in the opening pages of the
Report.6
Our panel is to consider “the adequacy of current succession law in light
of the Constitution and policy considerations.” I interpret “current
succession law” to include both the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the
Presidential Succession Act of 1947.7
As for the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, which has been widely commended, I believe it is perfectly
adequate in doing what it set out to do. It does not resolve every
conceivable problem, nor does it purport to do so. But what it addresses, it
handles quite well.
As for the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, which has been widely
criticized, I am going to play devil’s advocate and defend it. I hasten to add
that I am going to give only one and a half cheers for it as of 2010, though I
would have given two cheers for it in 1947. First, I shall defend it from a
constitutional standpoint: both from a particular reading of who may be an
“Officer” within the meaning of the Succession Clause of Article II, Section
1of the Constitution and from a general conception of separation of powers
principles. Second, I shall defend it from the standpoint of policy. I shall
present President Truman’s policy arguments in support of the Act and
acknowledge the good in them. But, like Goldstein, I will point to changes
in our politics since 1947 that somewhat undercut the wisdom of Truman’s
arguments.8
I. ONE AND A HALF CHEERS FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION ACT OF
1947
The literature on presidential succession has not been kind to the
Presidential Succession Act of 1947: most commentators argue that it is
2. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 17–23 (2d ed. 1992).
3. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 433–38 (2005).
4. JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
196–210 (1965).
5. Id. at 207–10.
6. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 1, at 17–24.
7. Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)).
8. See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the 25th Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 965–68 (2010).
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both unconstitutional and unwise as a matter of policy.9 Before assessing
the Act’s constitutionality, I want to distinguish two competing general
approaches to separation of powers questions. One is formalist, categorical,
and hermetic.10 The other is functionalist, flexible, and pragmatic.11 In
recent years, the former approach has been highly vocal, and we see it most
clearly in Justice Scalia’s separation of powers jurisprudence and that of his
acolytes, including Professor Steven G. Calabresi.12 Those who take this
approach find the very idea of legislative succession to the Presidency
repugnant to their formalist, hermetic vision.13 It is also a pox on their
grand conception of a unitary executive.14
By contrast, I take a pragmatic, flexible approach to separation of powers
generally, and so I accord a great deal of deference to practical
arrangements worked out by the President and Congress. I believe, with
Richard E. Neustadt and most political scientists, that we do not have a
system of pure “separation of powers,” but instead a system of “separated
institutions sharing powers.”15 I am opposed to importing grand normative
theories of the formalist separation of powers and the unitary executive and
imposing them upon such practical arrangements as presidential succession
(or, for that matter, legislative vetoes,16 line item vetoes,17 and the like). In
recent years, I believe, the formalist approach has done great damage to the
workings of our political system, and it has underestimated the pragmatic
complexities of the workings of the modern administrative state. This
approach underpins many arguments against the constitutionality of the
Presidential Succession Act of 1947.

9. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential
Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, The
Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155 (1995); John C. Fortier
& Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L.
REV. 993 (2004); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Principles and Presidential
Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345 (2001).
10. See, for example, Justice Hugo L. Black’s opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger’s opinion of the Court in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Chief Justice Burger’s
opinion of the Court in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); and Justice Scalia’s
dissenting opinions in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) and Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413–27 (1989).
11. See, for example, Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 634–55; Chief Justice Burger’s opinion of the Court in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974); Justice Byron R. White’s dissents in Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967–1013,
and Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 759–76; Justice Harold A. Blackmun’s opinion of the Court in
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 361; and Justice Breyer’s dissent in Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417, 469–97 (1998).
12. See Calabresi, supra note 9, at 163–66.
13. Id.
14. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995).
15. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS 29
(1990).
16. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (declaring legislative veto unconstitutional).
17. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 446–49 (1998) (declaring line item veto
unconstitutional).
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By contrast, I develop my pragmatic, flexible approach to separation of
powers from what our practice has been, not from grand, normative
formalist conceptions from on high. And I accord considerable deference
concerning the constitutionality of practices, like legislative succession, that
have been in place since the early years of our constitutional system.18
Therefore I see no constitutional infirmity in legislative succession. And I
relish the fact that, contrary to the so-called originalists’ arguments against
the constitutionality of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, as
Goldstein pointed out, the better originalist arguments are in favor of the
constitutionality of legislative succession.19
Let us turn to the question of the meaning of the word “Officer” in the
Succession Clause of the Constitution.20 Article II, Section 1 empowers
Congress, in the absence of a functioning President or Vice President, to
declare “what Officer” shall act as President.21 I read this clause to mean
simply that Congress is empowered to declare who shall act as President,
that is, who shall succeed the President and Vice President. Whoever
Congress designates shall, by virtue of that fact, be an officer. I realize that
much ink has been spilled on the question of whether an “Officer” must be
an “Officer of the United States,” and whether an “Officer” is a term of art
referring to executive or judicial officers rather than legislative officers or
indeed to only executive officers.22 I reject all of these arguments as driven
by a misguided formalist conception of separation of powers.
I want to focus on the language of the Constitution and to interpret it in
light of the pragmatic, flexible scheme of separation of powers, together
with checks and balances, established in our constitutional scheme. We
should read the Constitution to make sense as a matter of ordinary
understanding. And, we should avoid readings that construe ordinary
language like “Officers” as terms of art. If we take this pragmatic
approach, we will not be driven to artificial conclusions like saying that
“Officers” means only executive officers and that the Speaker of the House
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate are not “Officers” in a
constitutional sense. An “Officer” is simply a person who holds an office.
That would include the Speaker of the House and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate. Indeed, an “Officer” could include the Governor of
the most populous state (even if an “Officer of the United States” would
not). And it could include anyone named by the President to a group of
advisors who would be in the line of succession (to be recommended
below). The fact that both Goldstein23 and John Feerick24 raise doubts

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (repealed 1886).
See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1042–45.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
Id.
See, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 114–17; Calabresi, supra note 9, at 156–

67.
23. See Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1090–1113._
24. See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 980–92 (2010).
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about the conventional arguments against the Act’s constitutionality
bolsters my judgment that it is not unconstitutional.
As for the wisdom of the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, I accord a
considerable amount of deference to the judgment of pragmatic presidents
(and former senators) like Harry Truman over the judgment of formalist law
professors. What is there to be said for the Presidential Succession Act of
1947? Truman said two things. One, Truman did not believe that the
President should have the power to choose his own successor, and therefore
favored legislative succession over cabinet succession.25 That sounds
sensible, to a point, though perhaps it sounds less sensible to us now than it
seemed to him in 1947. Nowadays, people are more enamored with the
unitary executive and the imperial presidency than they were back in 1947.
That may make people more comfortable today with the idea that the
President should be able to choose his successor, and less comfortable with
the idea of legislative succession. And nowadays, the President to a greater
degree chooses her own successor to begin with in selecting a vice
presidential running mate; and so, perhaps, people would worry less about
the fact that a President would be naming her own successor farther down
the line through nominating a cabinet. But, of course, the presidential
nominee’s choice as a vice presidential running mate has to be confirmed
by the delegates to the nominating convention and by the voters in the
election.
Two, Truman thought that the successors should be people who had been
elected, rather than merely appointed, which argued for legislative
succession over cabinet succession.26 Indeed, Truman argued that the
Speaker of the House had a superior electoral pedigree to everyone other
than the President and Vice President.27 Unlike many constitutional law
scholars, I believe that there is eminent practical wisdom here. Just as there
is practical wisdom in the anecdote that when then-Vice President Lyndon
Johnson boasted to Speaker Samuel T. Rayburn about President John
Kennedy’s choosing “the best and the brightest” for his Cabinet, Rayburn
supposedly said he would feel more comfortable “if just one of them had
run for sheriff once.”28 Remarkably, some constitutional law scholars of
today, like Calabresi, Akhil R. Amar, and Vikram D. Amar,29 suggest that
cabinet officers have a greater democratic pedigree than do the leaders of
the House and Senate! They emphasize that the President is elected, and
that the Senate advises and consents on presidential nominations for cabinet
posts. But I daresay that only a few law professors and champions of the
unitary executive would say that this denotes that the Secretary of the

25. Special Message from President Harry S. Truman to the Congress on the Succession
to the Presidency (June 19, 1945) [hereinafter Truman’s Special Message] (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 39, 41 (1972).
29. Amar & Amar, supra note 9, at 130; Calabresi, supra note 14, at 23, 31–33, 58–70.
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Treasury enjoys a superior democratic pedigree to the Speaker of the
House!
I acknowledge that people today are more dubious about legislative
succession because of the increasing prevalence of divided government,
making more likely the prospect of a change in party control of the
Presidency through legislative succession. I also believe that people today
are more dubious about legislative succession because they are more
disparaging toward legislatures and legislators’ capabilities in general. I
have studied the disparagement of legislatures, and even organized a
conference entitled The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in
the Twenty-First Century.30 I have never seen such disparagement of
Congress as in the literature on presidential succession! Except perhaps at
the Tea Party gatherings! The only criticism I have of the Continuity of
Government Commission Report is that it unfairly disparages the capacities
of members of the House and Senate.
Truman had a third idea—special elections—with the consequence that
legislative succession would be only an interim measure, to be followed by
the election of a President.31 Unfortunately, the Presidential Succession
Act of 1947 did not adopt that proposal. I advocate special elections below.
Thus, I conclude that legislative succession under the Presidential
Succession Act of 1947 is not unconstitutional and that the policy
arguments in support of it are not as bad as is commonly thought. Now I
turn to minor, feasible changes I would propose.
II. PROPOSED MINOR, FEASIBLE CHANGES TO THE PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION ACT OF 1947
I would tweak the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 with three minor,
feasible changes, all of which would leave legislative succession in place,
since I am assuming that Congress is unlikely to repeal this feature of the
current arrangement. One, I would change the legislative succession in a
way that would avoid the potential transfer of power from one party to
another: (1) instead of the Speaker of the House, the successor would be
the leader of the President’s party in the House (whether it be the Speaker
of the House, the House Majority Leader, or the House Minority Leader)
and (2) instead of President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the successor would
be the leader of the President’s party in the Senate (whether it be the Senate
Majority Leader or the Senate Minority Leader). Both of these changes are
more feasible than changing legislative succession to cabinet succession.
And, both avoid a transfer of power from one party to another through
legislative succession.
Two, I would institute a vice Vice President or a body of successors
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. I think most
commentators have given too short shrift to the idea of a vice Vice
30. See generally Symposium, The Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in
the Twenty-First Century, 89 B.U. L. REV. 331 (2009).
31. Truman’s Special Message, supra note 25.
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President. For a time, it was hard even to get highly capable people
interested in the Vice Presidency. For example, John Nance Garner, Vice
President under Franklin Delano Roosevelt from 1933–1941, famously said
the Vice Presidency was “not worth a pitcher of warm piss.”32 That has
certainly changed,33 but it still might be difficult to get highly qualified
people interested in a vice Vice Presidency.
Who, you may ask, would want that office? Well, for starters, any
former President or Vice President who is physically and mentally capable
of serving. For example, William J. Clinton and Albert A. Gore could stand
in the line of succession after Vice President Joseph R. Biden. And George
W. Bush and Richard B. Cheney could do so under a Republican
Presidency. I realize that questions of disability might arise with very
senior former presidents and vice presidents (e.g., George H.W. Bush in
advanced years or Ronald W. Reagan while he was alive but had
Alzheimer’s). I also acknowledge that questions of competence might arise
in some instances, for example, some might worry about having Dan
Quayle in the line of succession. I also think it would be good for these
successors to be interim or acting presidents, with a special election to
follow soon.
In my ideal line of succession, former presidents and vice presidents
should come before either legislative leaders or cabinet members. They
have considerable relevant experience and knowledge. They typically have
not returned to elective office. And some of them live and work in places
outside Washington, D.C. In my second-best line of succession, given the
unlikelihood that Congress will give up legislative succession, former
presidents and vice presidents would come after legislative leaders and
before cabinet members.
Another possibility I would embrace is an idea put forward by Goldstein,
for Congress to “create a number of new ‘officers’” whose responsibility
would be “simply [to] serve as wise men and women who would be briefed,
who would be available to advise the President and serve as contingent
successors.”34 The Continuity of Government Commission makes a similar
recommendation.35 Both Goldstein and the Commission would place them
after cabinet members in the line of succession. I would place them before.
I note that Goldstein and the Commission implicitly are assuming, as I do,
that an “Officer” does not have to be a sitting federal executive or judicial
officer. I also would observe that Goldstein gives as examples not only
former presidents and vice presidents but also elder statesmen like William
W. Bradley, John C. Danforth, and Colin L. Powell. Such people, I
daresay, would be willing to serve as vice Vice President in this sense, or as
officers in a body of contingent successors.
32. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, FDR 178 (2007) (citing Elliot A. Rosen, “Not Worth a Pitcher
of Warm Piss”: John Nance Garner as Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE
VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 45, 45 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997)).
33. See generally Goldstein, supra note 8.
34. Id. at 1069.
35. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 1, at 45.
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If we want people with executive experience in the line of succession, let
us put the governors of the most populous five states in the line of
succession, provided that they are of the same party as the President. They
also would have the benefit of living and working outside Washington,
D.C. Here, I should note that I disagree with the Amars that “Officers”
must be “Officers of the United States,” which excludes state officials. In
any case, the President could name these governors to this body and as such
they would be “Officers.”
Finally, I would institute special elections, thus making all forms of
succession (whether legislative, cabinet, or vice vice presidential)
temporary. This was the practice in the original statute, the Presidential
Succession Act of 1792.36 Truman argued for special elections,37 as does
the Continuity of Government Commission,38 and just about everyone else
who has thought about the matter. Everybody, that is, except the ones who
have mattered thus far: the Republican Congress that adopted the
Presidential Succession Act of 1947.

36. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, §10, 1 Stat. 239, 240–41 (repealed 1886).
37. Truman’s Special Message, supra note 25.
38. CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMMIS’N, supra note 1, at 47.

